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Articles & Speeches
ARBITRATION OF RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
SPORTS ARENA
James A.R. Nafziger"
Arbitration of disputes related to international sports competition is
a growth industry. Certainly one of the most important developments in
sports law during the past few years has been the expanded role of the
Court of Arbitration for Sport ("CAS").' Business is also brisk for the
American Arbitration Association and other national arbitral bodies

around the world.2 Many of the disputes have involved the eligibility of
3
athletes on the eve of sanctioned international competition.
I. GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL

SPORTS ARBITRATION

In 1988, not a single demand for arbitration was filed during the runup to the Olympic Games in Seoul. 4 By contrast, in 2000, the docket
prior to the Sydney Games numbered some eight cases in the United
States alone5 and six times that number in Australia. 6 Arbitration of
international sports disputes in Europe is also common. 7 The growth

* Thomas B. Stoel Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law; Vice President,
International Association of Sports Law. This article is based on the author's remarks at a
conference in Chicago on November 2 and 3,2000, entitled, "Arbitrating Sports Disputes: A
World View." This conference was organized by the Valparaiso University School of Law.
The author thanks Christopher Cipoletti and Steven J.Thompson for their assistance in the
preparation of this article.
ISee Matthieu Reeb, The Role of the Court of Arbitrationfor Sport, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE HAGUE'S 750TH ANNIVERSARY 233 (Wybo P. Heer ed., 1999); James A.R. Nafziger, The
Court of Arbitration for Sport and the General Process of International Sports Law, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HAGUE'S 750TH ANNIVERSARY 239 (Wybo P. Heer ed., 1999).
2 Newspaper headlines tell the story. See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Ready, Set, Arbitrate!:Here is This
Year's New Hot Olympic Event: Arbitration, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2000, at Al, A6; Vicki
Michaelis, Roster Disputes Go Down to the Wire, USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 2000, at 1C.
ISee, e.g., LAURI TARASTI, LEGAL SOLUTIONS ININTERNATIONAL DOPING CASES: AWARDS BY
THE IAAF ARBITRATION PANEL 1985-1999 (2000); RECUEIL DES SENTENCES DU TAS/DGEST
OF CAS AWARDS 1986-1998 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 1998).
Bravin, supra note 2, at Al.
- Michaelis, supra note 2, at IC.
6Id.
7See, e.g., LUc SILANCE, LES SPORTS ET LE DROIT 406-08, 417-18 (1998) (referring particularly
to Belgian and French practice).
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industry of international sports arbitration is clearly multinational.
Hailing, as I do, from the state that brought you Tonya Harding in 1994,8
Mary Decker Slaney in 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999, 9 and Matt Lindland in
200010 - three very different individuals, but all seasoned veterans of
arbitration - I hope you appreciate that we Oregonians are doing our
part to fuel this industry. And, as Matt Lindland's silver medal in
Sydney attests, we are getting better at quality control within the
industry.
What accounts for this "trendy Olympic event,"" this "burgeoning
Olympic sport of arbitration," 12 as it has been called?
Several
explanations are immediately apparent. Video taping and electronic
records of trials and final events provide better evidence to resolve
disputes and thereby encourage more challenges to decisions. More
obviously, perhaps, issues involving doping and the use of other
performance-enhancing agents have sparked a substantial amount of
arbitration. Even though the identification, testing, and sanctioning of
prohibited substances and techniques are more effective today than even
five years ago, the circumstances of their procurement, distribution and
use are subtle and often ambiguous, giving rise to more disputes. And
speaking of agents, the growing role of professional agents and sports
lawyers has given athletes a keener eye for infractions of their rights,
procedures for implementing those rights, and alternative remedies for
redressing their grievances. Today's athletes have a better idea of their
rights and are prepared to act on them regardless of the traditional
etiquette against doing so on the eve of competition. They also know
that the stakes of eligibility are much higher than they used to be.
In responding to these developments, arbitration has become a
preferred means for resolving sports-related disputes. In the United
States, this trend is in part the result of the Ted Stevens Olympic and
Amateur Sports Act1 3 - otherwise known as the Amateur Sports Act which endorses arbitration to resolve disputes in the sports arena. The
law requires National Governing Bodies ("NGBs") for each sport to

See James A.R. Nafziger, InternationalSports Law as a Processfor Resolving Disputes, 45 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 130,140-42 (1996).
9

See TARASTI, supranote 3, at 155.

infra Parts II-IL.
11Michaelis, supranote 2, at 1C.
12Jere Longman, On the Olympics: Athktes Are Taking the Trialsfrom the Arenas to the Courts,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 23,2000, at C23.
13 36 U.S.C.A. §§ 220501-220509 (West Supp. 2000) ("Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur
Sports Act").
10 See
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agree to submit all disputes within the scope of the Act to binding
arbitration by the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). The law
also entitles Olympic, Pan American and Paralympic athletes, or other
parties aggrieved by decisions of the United States Olympic Committee
("USOC"), to a review of their grievances by the AAA. 14 Under the
USOC Constitution, NGB decisions are subject to arbitration by the
AAA.
Beyond the United States, at the global level, many international
sports federations ("IFs") have entered into agreements with the CAS for
binding arbitration of disputes between them and their constituents. In
turn, IFs normally require their member organizations to provide for
arbitration of their disputes with athletes. Athletes selected for the
Olympics and other international competition must now sign a waiver
form by which they agree to exclusive CAS jurisdiction over all disputes
involving doping and other issues of eligibility.' 5 In Ragheeb v. bOC, 16 the
CAS confirmed that it could review an issue of eligibility only on the
basis of such an arbitration agreement or a specific accreditation of an
athlete for competition by the IOC. Because of the emerging role of the
CAS in resolving these kinds of disputes at the international level, one
commentator has suggested that the Amateur Sports Act should be
amended to substitute the International Council of Arbitration for Sport,
which is the parent organization of CAS, in place of the AAA as the
designated arbitral body to hear all disputes between athletes and the
17
USOC or its designated NGBs.
For all these reasons, international sports arbitration is a growth
industry. Litigation, on the other hand, is number two and, therefore,
has to try harder. But courts have found it hard to try harder. Courts of
law are, first of all, very reluctant to review eligibility and other
decisions by sports bodies involving access to competition. When they
do undertake such review, the process is often time-consuming and
risky.'8 Although that may also be true for arbitration, on balance,

1436 U.S.C.A. § 220529 (West Supp. 2000).
15

OLYMPIC CHARTER 74 (2000).
The decision of Ragheeb v. IOC is a decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sport. This
decision is unpublished and on file with CAS in Lausanne, Switzerland. Ragheeb v. IOC,
CAS (August 30, 2000) (on file with CAS).
17 Edward E. Hollis Ill, Note, The U.S.A. Olympic Committee and the Suspension of Athletes:
Reforming Grievance Procedures Under the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 71 IND. L.J. 183, 200
16

(1995).
Is See generally, James A.R. Nafziger, InternationalSports Law: A Replay of Characteristicsand
Trends, 86 Am. J. INT'L L. 489, 508-10 (1992).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2001

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 2 [2001], Art. 2

360 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35
arbitration is less costly, more expeditious, and more flexible in
responding to new circumstances.
The 1998 Amendments to the
Amateur Sports Act that bar athletes from litigating eligibility decisions
within twenty-one days before major competition also encourage
arbitration unless the newly created USOC ombudsman is successful in
facilitating a resolution of the dispute. 19

II. RECENT DEVELOPMENT: LINDLAND V. U.S.A. WRESTLING
Arbitration is not, however, without its problems. For one thing, any
third-party settlement of grievances by athletes is apt to be controversial.
After all, good sportsmanship is supposed to avoid squabbling.
Disputes are supposed to be resolved on the playing field. But legal
disputes are inevitable. When they do arise, any review process on the

eve of major competition may affect team morale, compete for the
attention of sports organizations at the expense of athletes, consume

19 The amended law provides as follows:
(a) General. [...] In any lawsuit relating to the resolution of a dispute
involving the opportunity of an amateur athlete to participate in the
Olympic Games, the Paralympic Games, or the Pan-American Games,
a court shall not grant injunctive relief against the corporation within
21 days before the beginning of such games if the corporation, after
consultation with the chair of the Athletes' Advisory Council, has
provided a sworn statement in writing executed by an officer of the
corporation to such court that its constitution and bylaws cannot
provide for the resolution of such dispute prior to the beginning of
such games.
(b) Ombudsman.(1) The ... ombudsman for athletes.., shall(A) provide independent advice to athletes at no
cost about the applicable provisions of this chapter
(citation omitted) and the constitution and bylaws
of the corporation, national governing bodies, a
paralympic
sports
organizations
(sic],
international sports federations, the International
Olympic Committee, the International Paralympic
Committee, and the Pan-American Sports
Organization, and with respect to the resolution of
any dispute involving the opportunity of an
amateur athlete to participate in the Olympic
Games, the Paralympic Games, the Pan-American
Games, world championship competition or other
protected competition as defined in the
constitution and bylaws of the corporation;
(B) assist in mediating any such disputes.
36 U.S.C.A. § 220509 (1994 & West Supp. 2000).
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valuable training time for the competitors, and sap their energy.t ° Even
so, the enthusiasm of Tammy Thomas, Lisa Raymond, Matt Lindland,
Julie Smith and other claimants to pursue their rights to participate in
international competition appeals to us more than the apathy of certain
men's tennis and basketball players whom we might like to have seen in
Sydney.
What, then, are the hurdles in the path of arbitration and how can
they be cleared? In addressing this question, the dispute between Matt
Lindland and the United States of America Wrestling Association
("U.S.A. Wrestling") is a good place to begin.
In one sense, the Lindland case is unusual because it does not involve
the dominant theme in international sports arbitration of doping. The
case does, however, raise a number of significant issues about the
structure for resolving eligibility disputes and the role of arbitration in
this structure. Lindland demonstrates what happens when function
follows form in dispute resolution.
On June 24, 2000, in Bout #244 of the Greco-Roman Wrestling trials
to determine the United States Olympic team, Keith Sieracki beat Matt
Lindland 2-1 in a best-of-three series to gain a berth on the team in the
seventy-six kilogram (167.5-pound) class.21 In accordance with U.S.A.
Wrestling rules, the three mat officials included a referee, a judge, and a
mat chairman. Lindland immediately protested the officiating of his
loss, claiming that Sieracki had applied an illegal hold by using his legs
and had also attempted to flee a hold in violation of the rules of both the
international wrestling federation ("FILA") and U.S.A. Wrestling. 22

20 See

Michaelis, supra note 2, at 2C.
a summary and chronology see Gary Mihoces, Grappling with a Decision Lindland Goes
to Sydney, While Sieracki Stays Home, USA TODAY, Sept. 14, 2000, at 1C.
22
The Official Rules of FILA (the F( dration Internationale des Luttes Associes) (1999) are
the international rules of wrestling. These rules have largely been adopted by U.S.A.
Wrestling with some modifications. Article 61 of the FILA Rules provides as follows:
A. In Greco-Roman Wrestling, it is forbidden to grasp the opponent below the
hips or to squeeze him with the legs. All pushing, pressing or "lifting" by
means of contact with the legs on any part of the body of the opponent is
also strictly forbidden.
In Greco-Roman wrestling, unlike Free Style wrestling, it is necessary to
accompany the opponent to the ground.
B. In Free Style wrestling, a scissor lock with the feet crossed is forbidden on
the head, the neck or the body.
FILA Rules, available at http://www.iat.uni-leipzig.de/iat/fila/RULES/drules.htm (last
visited March 27,2001).
21 For
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Lindland's protest complied with the Protest Procedures of U.S.A.
Wrestling and special procedures for the 2000 Olympic trials. The
Protest Committee, however, refused to overturn the decision against
Lindland on the basis that it involved judgment calls by mat officials that
were beyond the Committee's competence to review. For good reason,
mat decisions are simply not subject to change on review. Lindland
appealed the denial of his protest to U.S.A. Wrestling's Standing GrecoRoman Sport Committee. He argued before this body, in a telephonic
hearing on July 13, 2000, that the mat officials had not simply
misinterpreted U.S.A. Wrestling rules, but had misapplied them. For
proof of his claim, he demanded that the Committee view a videotape of
the match despite an organizational rule against the use of videotaped
evidence.
Six days later, on July 19, 2000, the Standing Committee denied
Lindland's appeal, four to one, largely on the basis of the discretion
vested in mat officials to make or not make penalty calls. As a result,
U.S.A. Wrestling added Sieracki's name to the roster of nominations to
be submitted to the USOC for the 2000 Olympic team. Lindland then
brought a demand for arbitration in Chicago of his grievance against
U.S.A. Wrestling, 23 as he was entitled to do under the Amateur Sports
Act.24 Such proceedings are usually referred to as Article IX arbitrations,
after Article IX of the USOC Constitution. 25 In accordance with the
Amateur Sports Act, the winner of the disputed event, Keith Sieracki,
was not a party to the arbitration between Lindland and U.S.A.
Wrestling.
In the Chicago arbitration, Lindland argued that U.S.A. Wrestling
had not provided procedures for the prompt and equitable resolution of
his grievance, as the Amateur Sports Act requires.26 This requirement

Article 57 of the FILA Rules provides as follows: "Fleeing a hold occurs when the
defending wrestler openly refuses contact in order to prevent his opponent from executing
or initiating a hold." Id. Article 59 of the FILA Rules ("Illegal Holds") establishes several
duties of the referee in the event of a prohibited act by a competitor. Id. Lindland claimed
the referee failed to fulfill these duties.
2 Lindland v. United States Wrestling Ass'n, Inc., Am. Arb. Ass'n No. 30-190-00443-00
(Aug. 9,2000) (Burns, Arb.).
2436 U.S.C.A. § 220529 (West Supp. 2000).
25 This provision implements the provision in the Amateur Sports Act for arbitration of

grievances against the USOC. US. OLYMPIC COMMITTEE CONST., arL IX.
- 36 U.S.C.A. § 220522(a)(13) (West Supp. 2000) ("An amateur sports organization is

eligible... to continue to be recognized, as a national governing body only if it... provides
procedures for the prompt and equitable resolution of grievances of its members."). 36
U.S.C. § 220503(8) assigns the following purpose to the USOC and therefore, by delegation,
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formed the legal framework of the proceedings that followed. The gist
of Lindland's arguments was that the Greco-Roman review committee
had failed to follow U.S.A. Wrestling's own rules and had fashioned new
ones to suit its interests, for example, by recusing four committee
members who might have supported Lindland's claim. The arbitrator,
Daniel Burns, agreed with Lindland and ordered a rematch between the
two competitors. Sieracki participated in the rematch under protest. This
time Lindland won 8-0. U.S.A. Wrestling, however, simply added
Lindland to its Olympic eligibility list as an alternate, leaving Sieracki as
its nominee to the USOC for the Olympic team. Lindland responded by
seeking enforcement of the arbitral award in the federal District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois. The court dismissed his action,
without a written opinion, apparently for lack of federal jurisdiction. 27
Now, let us return to the arbitral award.
After the Chicago award but prior to the rematch, Sieracki filed his
own arbitration demand in Denver before A. Bruce Campbell, seeking
confirmation of his status as the sole nominee in his weight class for the
Greco-Roman wrestling team.2
Lindland counterclaimed to the
opposite effect. So, we have the prospect of a rematch of dispute
resolution as well as wrestling. As we shall see, however, the prospect of
repetitive dispute resolution by virtue of a second round of arbitration in
Denver was fuzzy because some of the issues in Denver were materially
different from those in the Chicago arbitration. The Denver arbitrator
first determined the arbitration was proper and allowed all evidence
offered by the parties except the videotape of Bout #244. Sieracki won
this second round of arbitration. After four conferences in which all
parties in the overall dispute participated, Arbitrator Campbell
determined that Sieracki was not bound by the Chicago Award because
he had not been a party to it. He found no evidence that the mat officials
in Bout #244 had misapplied the rules or otherwise abused their

to the NGBs: "to provide swift resolution of conflicts and disputes involving amateur

athletes, national governing bodies, and amateur sports organizations, and protect the
opportunity of any amateur athlete, coach, trainer, manager, administrator, or official to
participate in amateur athletic competition."
27 See Lindland v. United States Wrestling Ass'n, Inc., 230 F.3d 1036,1038 (7th Cir. 2000).
28Sieracki v. United States Wrestling Ass'n, Inc., Am. Arb. Ass'n No. 30-190-00483-00 (Aug.
24, 2000) (Campbell, Arb.). Since this second arbitration did not fall within the prescribed
process for reviewing a grievance under the Amateur Sports Act, it had the rather odd
posture of a friendly action between the like-minded Sieracki and U.S.A. Wrestling as a
means to confirm the latter's decision in Sieracki's favor, to challenge the fairness of the
Chicago arbitration, and to question whether the notice and circumstances of the rematch
were fair. See id.
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authority.
He also found that U.S.A. Wrestling's procedural
arrangements, including the review committee's refusal to hear the team
coach's testimony or to view video tape of the match, had not prejudiced
either wrestler, did not constitute an irregularity or impropriety, and did
not justify setting aside the grievance process. The Denver Award
concluded by ordering U.S.A. Wrestling to withdraw Lindland's name
from the eligibility list for the team and to confirm Keith Sieracki as the
sole nominee on the team roster to be submitted to the USOC.
Just a few hours after the Denver Award, however, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court in its refusal to enforce
the Chicago Award in Lindland's favor and issued a mandate to U.S.A.
Wrestling to enforce the award by nominating Lindland to the USOC. 29
When Lindland sought to enforce this decision, however, the district
court refused again on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction. 30 Lindland
then obtained a writ of mandamus from the Circuit Court that ordered
the lower court to enforce the Chicago Award. 31 At this point U.S.A.
Wrestling and the USOC were faced with what appeared to be
contradictory orders.
Since arbitration is not normally subject to issue and claim
preclusion, 32 each of the wrestlers therefore was free to seek judicial
confirmation of the arbitral award in his favor under § 9 of the Federal
Arbitration Act.33 Lindland, who was back in the federal courts for the
second time, specifically requested a court order to compel the USOC to
send his name to the IOC despite the USOC's argument that it could not
do so because it had already sent Sieracki's name to the IOC. The
Denver court, on the other hand, transferred the Sieracki action to the
Chicago federal court, where the opposing federal actions were
consolidated. (One might well ask what would have happened if the
federal district court in Denver had not transferred the Sieracki action to
the federal court in Chicago for consolidation of the two actions.)
After consolidation of the two actions, the Northern District of
Illinois court, in the face of the mandamus order issued by the Seventh
Circuit, directed the USOC to substitute Lindland for Sieracki as U.S.A.
Wrestling's sole nominee to the USOC and denied Sieracki's petition to
29

Lindland, 230 F.3d at 1040.
" See Lindland v. United States Wrestling Ass'n., Inc., 228 F.3d 782, 783 (7th Cir. 2000).
31Id.
-32Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Employees v. Burlington N. R.R., 24 F.3d 937, 939-41 (7th
Cir. 1994).
- 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994).
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confirm the Denver Award in his favor. In compliance with the district
court order, the USOC requested the IOC to replace Sieracki with
Lindland as a member of the Olympic team. It also appealed the court
ruling that required it to take this action. U.S.A. Wrestling appealed
each of the mandated district court decisions to the Seventh Circuit,
which upheld both orders. 34 In the end, less than two weeks before the
beginning of the Olympic Games, United States Supreme Court Justice
Stevens (also from Chicago, incidentally) denied a request by the USOC
35
for a stay of the Seventh Circuit's mandamus order.

From the record, it appears that the case was very ably, indeed
admirably argued by counsel for the parties. In view of the time
constraints, the advocacy was exemplary. And reasonable minds can
certainly differ on the outcome of the case. I personally have no quarrel
with it. But I do want to question several of its legal premises.
Fundamentally, the Chicago Award was based on a determination that
U.S.A. Wrestling's review of Lindland's protest was procedurally
defective. The arbitrator found that the organization's rules were
inadequate to deal with the issues that arose in the case concerning
possible conflict of interest, recomposition of the review committee, and
restrictions on testimony. 36
The materiality of these defects is
questionable, 37 as was the advisability of ordering a rematch rather than
a recomposition and reconvention of the Protest Committee.3 8 Simple

3 Lindland v. United States Wrestling Ass'n, Inc., 227 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000).
35See Jess Bravin, High Court Ensures Wrestler's Trip to Olympics, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2000, at
B19 (noting that Justice Stevens denied the request for review without comment).
-6See Lindland v. United States Wrestling Ass'n, Inc., Am. Arb. Ass'n No. 30-190-00443-00
(Aug. 9,2000) (Burns, Arb.).
17 See Sieracki v. United States Wrestling Ass'n, Inc., Am Arb. Ass'n No. 30-190-00483-00
(Aug. 24, 2000) (Campbell, Arb.).
m In the Chicago arbitration, the justification in the "Conclusion and Award" reads as
follows:
Changed situations of Committee participants, the question of the
President of USA will attend and vote [sic], the exigencies of the
present circumstances of final team selection, the fact that a crucial
witness's testimony was chilled at the first hearing, the potential
atmosphere of a reconvened full Committee, and the very lack of
guidance in USA Wrestling by-laws and rules, when grouped together,
are convincing that Lindland cannot be put back to the same position
he was on July 12, and cannot receive the prompt and equitable
resolution of his grievance that he has been promised. For example,
one excluded member of the Committee was a fellow wrestler with a
grievance pending at that time. That grievance has now been finally
resolved. Another mistake made in fashioning the July 13 Committee,
[sic] was the erroneous belief that some members of the Greco-Roman
Sports Committee had also voted on that Protest Committee, and they
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mathematics reveals that if Lindland's comer coach in Bout #244 had
recused himself, as would surely be appropriate, and if all of the
remaining three committee members who recused themselves had
instead voted in Lindland's favor, the result at most would have been a
tie, which would have been insufficient to reverse the original decision in
favor of Sieracki.39
Even so, the bases for review within U.S.A. Wrestling, as the process
developed, are murky. What is clear is that the by-laws and rules of
U.S.A. Wrestling did not provide any real guidance on appropriate
procedures for reviewing a protest of this sort.40 As a result, simply
reconvening the Protest Committee might not have overcome
apprehensions about the fairness of the administrative process.
U.S.A. Wrestling's refusal to entertain videotaped evidence except
for during-match viewing by mat officials and for viewing flagrant
misconduct and allegations of brutality is also questionable. The rule
against videotaped evidence is designed to shield judgment calls from
endless challenge and dispute. The rule thus protects the integrity of
officiating and avoids substituting arbitrators for referees. Nevertheless,
excluding videotaped evidence clearly conflicts with the rules of FILA,
the international wrestling federation. 41 Moreover, the governing law of

were excluded for that reason. In fact, only one member had actually
voted at the Protest Committee and that was the president of the USA
Wrestling, who testified he was an ad hoc member of the Committee
and may have attended one Committee meeting over the past several
years. As significant is the lack of guidance and advance notice on
these issues to Lindland, and Committee members, as he attempted to
process his protest. Unfortunately, the same lack of guidance defeats
any attempt to reconvene the Committee and provide a clean slate to
press his claim in the short time before final team selection.
Lindland, Am. Arb. Ass'n No. 30-190-00443-00.
39
See Sieracki, Am. Arb. Ass'n No. 30-190-00483-00, at 1(f).
40

The Chicago award found:

USA Wrestling has not provided any written rules, regulations, bylaws, or precedential authority justifying its actions and decisions
regarding: 1) the determination of the number and identities of the
Greco-Roman Sports Committee when hearing appeals such as
Lindland's; 2) grounds for excluding sitting Committee members from
participating and deliberating in appeals such as Lindland's; 3)
limitations on the nature and extent of the testimony of witnesses; 4)
who is permitted to appear and participate in the hearing....
Lindland, Am. Arb. Ass'n No. 30-190-00483-00, at Findings of Fact 19.
41 In the event of a protest, Article 63 of the Official Rules of FILA clearly encourages the
use of videotape.
See FILA Rules, available at http://www.iat.unileipzig.de/iat/fila/RULES/drules.htm (last visited March 27, 2001); see supra note 23. To
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the Amateur Sports Act seems to contemplate a freer evidentiary
environment by stating that "[t]he parties may offer any evidence they
desire and shall produce any additional evidence the arbitrators believe
is necessary to an understanding and determination of the dispute. The
arbitrators shall be the sole judges of the relevance and materiality of the
evidence offered." 42
Reasonable minds may, of course, differ on the advisability of
allowing videotaped evidence. What is hard to dispute, however, is the
complexity of the legal process which extended over a period of twoand-one-half months and involved thirteen stages of dispute
resolution.43 Surely that was an unlucky thirteen, not just for Sieracki,
but for the reputation of dispute resolution related to international sports
competition. In the cogent words of Matt Lindland's wife, "[t]hey're
probably going to have to change the rules after this one." 44
III. THE

SEVENTH CIRCUIT OPINIONS

The formal process for resolving the Lindland dispute merits
consideration. I would argue that, although the selection of Lindland to
the Olympic team was a reasonable outcome of the dispute, the premises
of the Seventh Circuit's orders to that effect are shaky. Indeed, Lindland
is a good example of the difficulty that federal courts have had in
defining their role in disputes involving the eligibility of athletes for
international competition.45
At the heart of the Seventh Circuit's opinions, written by Judge
Frank Easterbrook, is a conclusion that the Chicago Award was valid
while the Denver Award was invalid. 46 The rationale was that because
the Chicago Award had been upheld by a court of law, any later award,

the contrary, one of the few modifications of the FILA rules by U.S.A. Wrestling provides

as follows: "Under no circumstances shall the use of video tapes or films of a bout be
considered or shown in the evaluation of any protest. Elements of the FILA Protest
procedures may be applied as determined by the protest committee."
U.S.A.
Modifications, Article 63, U.S.A. Wrestling Protest Procedures (1999), available at
http://www.usawrestling.com.
The Denver Award wisely sidestepped the issue of whether U.S.A. Wrestling's rules are
"less or more wise" than those of FILA. Sieracki, Am. Arb. Ass'n No. 30-190-00483-00, at
11-6.
4236 U.S.C.A. § 220529(5) (West Supp. 2000).
43See Lindland v. United States Wrestling Ass'n., 230 F.3d 1036, 1037-38 (7th Cir. 2000)
(noting the several stages of litigation); Michaelis, supra note 2, at 1C.
-"Michaelis, supranote 2, at 1C.
0 See Nafziger, supra note 8, at 134-42 (discussing the Reynolds and Hardingcases).
SLindland v.

United States Wrestling Ass'n, Inc., 227 F.3d 1000,1005 (7th Cir. 2000).
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namely the one in Denver, could not purport to countermand it. Once
the court had ordered U.S.A. Wrestling and the USOC to substitute
Lindland for Sieracki on the Olympic team, that was it. Although the
Seventh Circuit's confirmation of the Chicago Award is certainly
reasonable, its negative conclusion about the Denver Award is much less
compelling. While acknowledging the lack of issue and claim preclusion
in arbitration, the court's opinion enlists two principal arguments against
the Denver Award, concluding therefore that it was "doubly flawed." 47
First, Judge Easterbrook concluded that the Denver Award was, in his
words, ultra vires because, unlike the Chicago Award, it was not
conceived as an appeal of a USOC or NGB decision under the Amateur
Sports Act. But he failed to appreciate that, unlike the Chicago
arbitration, which was premised in the Amateur Sports Act, the Denver
arbitration was brought under the USOC's Grievance Procedures for
Code of Conduct and Team Selection 2000 Olympic Games.
Second, Judge Easterbrook construed Rule 48 of the Commercial
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association to bar the
Denver Award as a redetermination of the merits of a claim already
decided.48 But Rule 48 merely bars a redetermination of the merits in a
modification of a single award. What makes the double arbitration in
Lindland so interesting is that the two awards involved different parties
and, to an extent, different issues. Not only did the Circuit Court
minimize these differences, but it took Denver Arbitrator Campbell to
task for deciding, in the court's words, to "ignore" Rule 48 "utterly" 49
and thereby to flout the judicial confirmation of the Chicago Award. But
Campbell had reason to ignore Rule 48 because it simply did not apply.
Judge Easterbrook's opinion emphasized that the winner of a
contested event is normally not a party to an Article IX proceeding. That
is certainly true and appropriate under the law. But there were four
material differences between the Chicago and Denver arbitrations. First,
the Denver claimant, Sieracki, had been unable to appear formally in the
Chicago arbitration. Although that did not in any way call into question
the Chicago Award, by the same token it enabled him to demand relief
in Denver from the mandatory rematch ordered by the Chicago Award.
Judge Easterbrook seems to have been bothered by Sieracki's timing of
this demand prior to the event itself. But what was Sieracki supposed to
do to vindicate his position after the award in the Chicago arbitration to
47 Id. at 1003.

Id. at 1004.
49Id.
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which he was not a party? Perhaps he should have waited a few days
until he had lost the rematch before pursuing a judicial remedy. But,
under the time constraints imposed by the Amateur Sports Act, it was
probably wise for him to get off the mat and get moving again. In any
event, he had standing under the 2000 Protest Rules to demand
arbitration. Surely, the Denver arbitrator was acting properly in hearing
the demand of an athlete whose original selection to the team was in
jeopardy.
Although many Article IX disputes involving allegations against an
athlete impact only indirectly on other identifiable competitors, an
either-or eligibility issue of the sort at issue in Lindland is materially
different. Article IX's exclusion of the disputed winner of an event in an
arbitration of that dispute presents a serious issue. It is simply unfair to
ignore the winner's interests on the basis that arbitration of a grievance
under the Amateur Sports Act excludes the winner as a party. In the
Denver arbitration, on the other hand, both of the contesting wrestlers, as
well as U.S.A. Wrestling, made appearances.
Second, the Denver arbitration, although it considered Lindland's
protest de novo, also heard new issues related to the rematch that
occurred while the Denver arbitration was pending. It simply is not
correct to conclude, as the Seventh Circuit opinion does, that "[t]he
whole point of the Campbell proceeding [Denver arbitration] was to
redecide issues."5 0 That may have been part of the point but by no
means the whole point. Judge Easterbrook's opinion itself acknowledges
that Sieracki initiated his arbitration, "protesting the result of the
rematch."5 ' Moreover, unlike the issues raised by Lindland in the
Chicago arbitration, Sieracki's demand in Denver sought a
determination that he should be the sole nominee to the Greco-Roman
Olympic team, to the exclusion of Lindland.
Third, it is reasonable to view the Denver arbitration as a fresh
proceeding, unaffected in part by the Seventh Circuit order that
confirmed the Chicago Award. After all, the rematch had converted
Sieracki, the original winner, into a loser. Surely, Sieracki, the "new"
loser, so to speak, should have been entitled to the same right to demand
the same kind of arbitration as Lindland, the "old" loser, so to speak, had
enjoyed. Thus, Sieracki could claim the arbitrability of his grievance
under either the Code of Conduct and Team Selection or, arguably,

5o

id.

s1Id. at 1003.
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under a theory that the results of the rematch could be contested as a
fresh action and hence that the second arbitration in Denver was proper
under the same provision of the Amateur Sports Act which Lindland
had legitimately invoked.
Even if one does not accept the recharacterization of the Denver
arbitration as a fresh action, perhaps because Sieracki had not exhausted
2
the internal protest and grievance procedures required by law,5 it
nevertheless seems clear that the complex of dispute resolution was
more of a muddle than the Seventh Circuit seems to have appreciated.
For instance, the opinions failed to appreciate the very real dilemma
faced by U.S.A. Wrestling and the USOC in the face of two inconsistent
awards. Instead, one of Judge Easterbrook's opinions intimates that
NGBs like U.S.A. Wrestling are "scofflaws,"5 3 chastises the USOC for
insisting that "it is entitled to do as it pleases - defying injunctions to its
heart's content,"5 4 and surmises a conspiracy between U.S.A. Wrestling
and the USOC in contempt of court.55 These observations may or may
not be correct, but that kind of fighting language by an appeals court,
without adequate proof, is disconcerting.
That said, one of the Circuit Court opinions does hint at some
productive new directions for resolving these kinds of disputes. In
Judge Easterbrook's words, conflicting instructions may not be an
"irremediable evil. Injunctions create property rights, which may be
altered by private agreements. Bargaining among Sieracki, Lindland,
and U.S.A. Wrestling could lead to a settlement that would relieve U.S.A.
Wrestling of any incompatible obligations." 56 Judge Easterbrook caps
this observation with a challenge: "Definitive resolution of the right way
to handle conflicting awards, after one has been confirmed, may await
another day."57
I am quite sure that that day has not yet arrived. I do want to ask,
however, what can be done, specifically, to improve the process. Let me
say again that I think both the Chicago and Denver arbitral awards in
Lindland were creditable. Neither was spoiled by any of the defects of

5

2 See 36 U.S.C.A. § 220529 (West Supp. 2000); Dolan v. U.S. Equestrian Team, Inc., 608 A.2d
434 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992). Sieracki, on the other hand, was seeking to vindicate
his initial victory under severe time constraints.
53
Lindland v. United States Wrestling Ass'n, Inc., 227 F.3d 1000,1008 (7th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1007.
5Id. at 1006.
56Id. at 1003.
57Id.
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corruption, fraud or evident partiality for which the Arbitration Act
allows an award to be set aside.s8 Even if one were to agree that a first
award ordinarily should bar a second award, the two awards in this case
differed substantially from each other.5 9
Consequently, Judge
Easterbrook's misunderstanding of the express reach of the first award,60
his caustic appraisal of the second award, and his injudicious namecalling were simply off the mat. The problem lay not in the second
arbitration itself but in the structure of dispute resolution that
encourages proliferation and, worse yet, redundancy of proceedings.
IV. IMPROVING THE STRUCTURE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Let me offer several suggestions to improve the structure. First, in
reviewing arbitrations under federal law, the courts should proceed
cautiously. Judicial relief from the decisions of sports bodies should be
reserved for cases where due process violations are patent, and the
violations dispositive, as they were not in Lindland. The financial stakes
for athletes, absent issues of labor law,61 do not alone provide a
compelling basis for judicial intervention. To quote another Seventh
Circuit judge, Richard Posner: "[T]here can be few less suitable bodies
than the federal courts for determining the eligibility, or the procedure
for determining the eligibility, of athletes ... "62 The Harding court in
Oregon also had it right, I think, in cautioning that:
Intervention [by the courts] is appropriate only in the
most extraordinary circumstances, where [a national
governing body] has clearly breached its own rules, that

MSee 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (Supp. V 1999).
59See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
60 Despite Judge Easterbook's argument that the Denver Award purported to rescind the
Chicago Award's order to place Lindland on the Olympic team, not only does the Denver
Award contain no such attempted rescission, but the Chicago Award, in the first instance,
did not actually order Lindland's selection to the U.S.A. Olympic team. See Lindland v.
United States Wrestling Ass'n, Inc., Am. Arb. Ass'n No. 30-190-00443-00 (Aug. 9, 2000)
(Burns, Arb.).
61 Compare the following timely observation:
U.S. courts and international federations must begin viewing amateur
athletics in a more employment-related light, as substantial sums of
money are at stake when suspensions of Olympic athletes occur. In
the US.A., amateur athletes have traditionally not been viewed as
"employees" due to the strict NCAA regulations prohibiting college
athletes from receiving financial rewards for their talents.
Mary K. Fitzgerald, T7 Court of Arbitrationfor Sport; Dealing with Doping and Due Process
During the Olympics, 7 SPORTs LAW. J.213, 236 (2000).
62
Michels v. United States Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155,159 (7th Cir. 1984).
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breach will imminently result in serious and irreparable
harm to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has exhausted all
internal remedies. Even then, injunctive relief is limited
to correcting the breach of the rules. The court should
63
not intervene in the merits of the underlying dispute.

Second, repetitious proceedings and the complexity they entail,
particularly in eligibility cases, could be avoided by amending the
Amateur Sports Act and the USOC Constitution to enable an individual
winner of a disputed competition to participate in a single arbitration
alongside the individual claimant, NGB and, as appropriate, the USOC.
It is simply unfair to presume that a contested winner's interests are fully
represented by an NGB. 64 A unified arbitration would then bar
subsequent arbitration. In team sports, the problem of standing to
appear is considerably more complicated. Even so, as a starter, team
members of a class potentially affected by an eligibility decision might
simply elect one of their number to represent their common interests.
Third, the Amateur Sports Act should be interpreted or, if necessary,
amended to avoid arbitration of a referee's decision so long as a claimant
has had the benefit of a full and fair review by the appropriate NGB,
unless that body would itself permit such a review. 65 In Lindland, the
Chicago Award steered clear of scrutinizing judgment calls. The Denver
Award, on the other hand, seemed to comment fairly directly on the
judgment of the mat officials. A procedural rule barring review of such
judgment calls in all but the most egregious cases would help avoid
understandable suspicions by the media and the public that arbitrators
can make second calls. In the Lindland-Sieracki match, there were three
mat officials, all of whom appear to have satisfied U.S.A. Wrestling's
requirement that they understood the rules and avoided wrongful,
dishonest, intentionally improper, or bad faith conduct.66 Even if they
failed to take account of illegal wrestling maneuvers in violation of the
6
3 Harding v. United States Figure Skating Ass'n, 851 F. Supp. 1476,1479 (D. Or. 1994).
&IU.S. OLYMPIc COMM. CONST., art IX, § 2 (providing that a demand for arbitration must
designate "such USOC member," normally an NGB, as an adverse party). See also Lindland
v. United States Wrestling Ass'n, Inc., 230 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2000). As Judge
Easterbrook's opinion points out, this is in keeping with the arrangement in labor
arbitration that an employee who is discharged from employment may arbitrate a
grievance with his employer but need not designate as an additional party a replacement
who may be dischargeable by an award in favor of the grievant. Id.
65Longman, supranote 12, at D8 ("There is no quicker way to kill spectator interest than to
have a game played and the outcome decided a month later by lawyers.").
66Sieracki v. United States Wresting Ass'n, Inc., Am. Arb. Ass'n No. 30-190-00483-00, 11-1, 2,
(Aug. 24,2000) (Campbell, Arb.).
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rules of the game, such bad judgment calls or inaction should not be
subject to arbitration or litigation in the absence of evidence that they
had simply failed to understand the rules or that they abused their
authority.
Fourth, we should make it clear that the merits not only of judgment
calls but of the rules of the game themselves are generally beyond the
competence of arbitration or litigation. After all, technical rules are
constantly under review and reform by the IOC, IFs and NGBs
themselves. One commentator has therefore proposed that the Amateur
Sports Act be amended to provide that the jurisdiction of courts under
the Act should be limited to determinations of whether responsible
sports organizations have complied with their own rules of eligibility,
presumably within an acceptable margin of discretion. This proposal
would bar courts from evaluating the merits of a dispute, confining their
review to an evaluation of procedural due process.67
In drawing a line between nonreviewable game rules and reviewable
rules, procedures and practices, two cases of the CAS are instructive.
The first arose out of an incident during the 1996 Atlanta Games.6 In
reviewing a referee's disqualification of an athlete, known as "Boxer M,"
for landing a below-the-belt punch on his opponent, the CAS applied
international custom, particularly from the United States, France, and
Switzerland. The CAS concluded from this general practice that a
technical decision, standard or rule - in other words, a nonreviewable
game rule - is shielded from arbitral or judicial scrutiny unless the rule
or its application by sports officials is arbitrary, illegal, or the product of
a wrong or malicious intent against an athlete. 69 In such cases, the rule
or its application is reviewable. Sanctions appearing to be excessive or
unfair on their face are also reviewable. The rationale for the Boxer M
decision was two-fold: that IFs have the responsibility to enforce rules,
and referees or ring judges are in a better position than arbitrators to
decide technical matters.7 0
In the second CAS case, the AOC Advisory Opinion, the CAS
considered the reviewability of a decision by the international swimming
federation ("FINA"), less than a year before the 2000 Olympic Games, to

67

Hollis, supra note 17, at 200.
supra note 3, at 413 (M. v. Ass'n Internationale de Boxe Amateur)(CAS Ad Hoc
Division, Atlanta 1996).
68 Reeb,

69Id.
7

0l

d.
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approve the use of full-body ("long john") swimsuits.71 These highly
elastic suits, which were first marketed by Speedo, attempted to simulate
natural sharkskin. The suits were designed to increase a swimmer's
speed and endurance, to reduce drag, and possibly to enhance the
buoyancy of the swimmer. The FINA Bureau, after lengthy discussion,
ruled that "the use of these swimsuits does not constitute a violation of
the FINA Rules."7 In response to this ruling, the Australian Olympic
Committee ("AOC"), nervous about possible claims of unfairness at the
Sydney Games, asked the CAS for an advisory opinion under its Rule 60.
The AOC inquired whether the FINA ruling had complied with FINA's
own rules and whether, in any event, use of the suits would raise
contestable issues of fairness. In a thorough and thoughtful opinion, the
CAS properly advised that FINA had reached its decision in compliance
with its own rules and that its ruling, which was tantamount to approval
of bodysuits, did not raise any reviewable issues of unfair procedure,
bad faith, conflict with general principles of law, or unreasonableness 7 3
Fifth, NGBs and other sports associations, under the supervision of
IFs, should draft more explicit and uniform rules of eligibility and
remedies for relief of legitimate grievances by athletes. Sheer chaos
reigns today, and that is grossly unfair to athletes. For example, NGBs
should clarify the precise weight that they will give to career records and
recent international performance in determining eligibility when team
tryouts alone are not determinative. Such clarification would have
avoided the arbitration to determine the composition of the U.S.
Women's softball team in Sydney and another arbitration involving the
U.S. women's cycling team. 74 The demand by Tammy Thomas, winner
of the 500-meter women's trial for the 2000 Olympics, against Christine
Witty, whom the United States cycling federation selected on the basis of
her superior two-year performance profile, was a variation on the
Lindland case. Although an arbitrator ordered a ride-off to settle the
controversy, much like the Lindland wrestling rematch, Witty, unlike
Sieracki, simply refused to show up and promptly filed her own
arbitration action.

71 Advisory

Opinion Delivered by the Ct. of Arbitration for Sport at the request of the
Australian Olympic Committee, TAS 2000/C/267 ACO (Richard M. McLaren, Sole
Arbitrator) (on file with author).
n 1d. at 12.
7- Id. at 19-21.
But see Janwillem Soek, You Don't Win Silver - You Miss the Gold, INT'L
SPORTS L.J., Sept. 2000, at 15 (criticizing the advisory opinion for assuming the existence of

a dispute between the AOC and FINA and thereby failing to resolve the issue of fairness of
the controversial bodysuits).
74Bravin, supra note 2, at Al.
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Let me underscore the need, for reasons of fairness, to harmonize
rules and remedies to make them as uniform and predictable as possible,
across the range of sports. For example, serious questions of equity and
due process arise whenever a track-and-field athlete is barred for life for
ingesting a substance that is permitted (or was permitted) in baseball.
Similarly, the Amateur Sports Act should make it clear that ad hoc
measures, such as rematches, should be only a last resort when
reconstitution of a defective eligibility review process would be grossly
unfair or impossible.
V. OBLIGATIONS OF ATHLETES

Finally, my most far-reaching suggestion for reform is that arbitral
awards should take account of obligations or duties as well as rights of
athletes. We often forget that the framework for protection of human
rights includes obligations or duties as well. It is a trade-off. Rights arise
out of reciprocal relations within a community. They are confirmed by
social contract. Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
establishes that "[elveryone has duties to the community in which alone
the free and full development of his personality is possible." 75 Similarly,
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights acknowledges
obligations and duties of individuals toward society, 76 and the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man establishes ten specific
duties.77
To be sure, this authority only confirms the reciprocal nature, in very
general terms, of the social contract putting human rights into play.
None of the human rights instruments comes close to identifying specific
duties of athletes or to providing any specific legal basis for imposing
duties on them. Still, the general authority provides a normative
foundation for more specific requirements. The Olympic Charter, for
example, establishes that "[t]he practice of sport is a human right." 78
Several decisions of the CAS have elaborated on the obligation of
athletes to serve the community interest in ensuring fairness and a level
playing field for all. For example, in several doping cases, the CAS

75 Art. 29, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd

Sess. Pt. 1, Resolutions, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); see Keba Mbaye, Sport and Hinnan
Rights, OLYMPIC REV., Dec. 1998-Jan. 1999, at 8-12.
76
AFRICAN CHARTER ON HuMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev.
5, arts. 27-29, (1981).
7AMERICAN DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTiES OF MAN, O.A.S. Res. XXX, O.A.S.
Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/I.4, arts 29-38, (1965).
78 OLYMPIC CHARTER, Fundamental Principle 8 (2000).
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established a duty of athletes to disclose information coming to their
79
attention about doping to the detriment of competition.
Although the ideal of athletes as role models is often romanticized
and exaggerated, athletes unquestionably influence young people. 8°
Therefore, in reviewing claims, arbitrators should consider the special
obligations or duties that athletes owe to society as well as their rights.
In reviewing disputes involving the status of athletes, the issue ought to
be what is in the best public interest, not just what is in the best interest
of particular sports.8 ' In that light, it is difficult to justify the outcome of
the Sprewell arbitration. Latrell Sprewell's physical, indeed nearly
homicidal, assault on Head Coach Peter Carlesimo and the Golden State
Warriors' team trainer, followed by his angry return from the locker
room to reiterate his threats and repeat his assaults, surely warranted the
most severe penalty. Accordingly, the National Basketball Association
("NBA"), in consultation with the Warriors, imposed a one-year, 82game suspension from NBA play without pay - the most severe sanction
that the NBA had ever imposed on a player. The Warriors also
terminated the remaining years in Sprewell's Uniform Player Contract
with the Golden State Warriors.82
However, the arbitrator hearing Sprewell's demand for relief
mitigated the suspension to the remaining 68 games of the season and
reinstated Sprewell's contract with the Warriors.8 3 The Grievance
Arbitrator's generous treatment of Latrell Sprewell unfortunately
minimized the social consequences of his decision. In all fairness, the
Grievance Arbitrator was fundamentally concerned about the issue of
due process insofar as there had been no precedent for the severe penalty
of a one-year suspension and termination of Sprewell's guaranteed
contract. Perhaps, though, precedent, like consistency, can be a

79Reeb, supra note 3, at 142,143, 158.

8 See, e.g., Rent Lefort & Jean Harvey, What's in a Game?, THE UNESCO COURIER, April
1999, at 18.
81 See Paul C. Weiler & Gary R. Roberts, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TXT, CASES, PROBLEMS 86
(#3) (2d ed. 1998).
82 See Latrell Sprewell Reinstatement Ruling, in Walter T. Champion, Jr., FUNDAMENTALS OF
SPORTS LAW 442 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
8
Sprewell later brought action in the federal district court against the NBA and the Golden
State Warriors claiming thirty million dollars in damages on the basis that the arbitral
award against him was racially discriminatory. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, C98-2053-VRW, 1999 WL 179682 (N.D. Ca. Mar. 26, 1999). Sprewel's action and a revised
version of it were both dismissed as meritless suits in 1998 and 1999, respectively. On
review, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower court. Sprewell v. Golden St.
Warriors, 231 F.3d 520 (9th Cir. 2000).
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hobgoblin. Perhaps serious physical assault should be treated the same
in the sports arena and sports arbitration as on the streets.
By the same token, sports organizations have ethical obligations to
society, too. This expectation underlies an arbitral decision that upheld
the most severe penalty ever imposed by the NBA.84 The Minnesota
Timberwolves had received this sanction for secretly conspiring with an
athlete to avoid the NBA's salary cap, a requirement that is further
elaborated in the league's collective bargaining agreement with the
players' association. Ethical issues of this sort are particularly serious
when, as in this case, an athlete and a sports association conspire to
violate fundamental organizational rules.
Although sports and athletes are special, their special status means a
higher standard of conduct. In the words of one observer, "players are
85
highly visible in the community, and that carries a public obligation."
Sport is also highly visible in the community. As we arbitrate rights and
perhaps take account of obligations within the international sports arena,
the public interest should be paramount. Surely that is an appropriate
world view for arbitrating sports disputes in the early twenty-first
century.

1" See David DuPree and Vicki Michaelis, Smith Cap Riding Upheld, USA TODAY, Nov. 10,
2000, at 1C (summarizing the arbitrator's approval of a penalty that denied the
Timberwolves first-round draft picks during the next five NBA drafts and fined them $3.5
million).
8 John Gibeaut, When Pros Turn Cons, ABA J., July 2000, at 108.
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